Wer hat Tausende zivile Opfer im Donbass-Krieg in der Ostukraine zu verantworten?

Im Donbass-Konflikt in der Ostukraine starben über 13.000 Menschen. Das ist immer wieder zu hören, und zwar von beiden Seiten. Doch wie groß ist der Anteil der zivilen Opfer, und vor allem: Welche Konfliktpartei hat sie zu verantworten?

Quelle: Wer hat Tausende zivile Opfer im Donbass-Krieg in der Ostukraine zu verantworten?

High risk of imminent large scale military operations in the Donbass — Réseau International (english)

The SAKER Most of you must by now have heard various reports about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Ukraine. Many, however, might have dismissed them because, let’s be honest here, we

über High risk of imminent large scale military operations in the Donbass — Réseau International (english)

Prof. Schachtschneider: Putin hat die Krim nicht Annektiert


WissensManufaktur.net postet auf Facebook 

Prof. Dr. iur. Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider: „‪#‎Putin‬ hat die ‪#‎Krim‬ nicht annektiert. Er war völkerrechtlich dazu verplichtet, die Sezession zu unterstützen. Und das hat er gemacht.“
Erster Alternativer Wissenskongress 2015. Kompletter Vortrag: https://www.youtube.com/watch…
Mehr zum Thema Krim: http://www.wissensmanufaktur.net/krim-zeitfragen

 

Eine gänzlich andere völkerrechtliche Einordnung nimmt Prof. Norman Paech vor:

Die Sezession der Krim

Neues Deutschland / 14. u. 24. März 2014

Nie war die Beschwörung des Völkerrechts so laut und unisono wie jetzt beim Abschied der Krim von der Ukraine und ihrem Weg nach Russland. Wir haben dieses Rechtsbewusstsein bei der Bombardierung Jugoslawiens im Frühjahr 1999, beim Überfall auf Irak im Mai 2003 oder beim Krieg gegen Libyen im März 2011 stark vermisst. Alles schwere Völkerrechtsverbrechen, ob unter Umgehung der UNO oder unter Missbrauch der Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrats. Gewiss, die einseitige Lostrennung der Krim von der Ukraine ist mit dem geltenden Völkerrecht nicht zu vereinbaren. Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker geht nicht so weit, dass es das ebenfalls garantierte Recht auf territoriale Integrität (Art. 2 Ziffer 7 UN-Charta) auch dann durchbrechen könnte, wenn es sich nicht um koloniale Abhängigkeit und rassistische Unterdrückung wie in den Befreiungskämpfen der 70er Jahre handelt…

ND Krim-Sezession.pdf
PDF-Dokument [86.6 KB]
Eine differenzierte Einordnung ins Internationale Völkerrecht findet sich bei Prof. Reinhard Merkel
21 Oktober 2014, 20:02

Internationales Völkerrecht – eine juristische Sicht auf die Krim und den Donbass

What Russians Think Of Western Sanctions Submitted by Vineyard of the Saker

Note: „… Der Westen hat für die Mehrheit der russischen Bevölkerung seine Glaubwürdigkeit verloren. ( For the majority of the Russian people the West has lost his credibility ). Vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit – das war einmal. ( Trustful cooperation, that’s history ). Jetzt geht es aus russischer Perspektive darum, sich zur Wehr zu setzen und sich nicht reinreden zu lassen.“ (zit.a. Gabriele KRONE-SCHMALZ: Russland verstehen. Der Kampf um die Ukraine und die Arroganz des Westens (Verlag C.H. Beck – München, Feb. 2015), S. 85f

zerohedge, Feb 17, 2015 — http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-17/what-russians-think-western-sanctions

What Russians Think Of Western Sanctions
Submitted by Vineyard of the Saker,

I parse the Russian media (corporate and social) on a daily basis and I am always amazed at the completely different way the issue of western sanctions is discussed. I think that it is important and useful for me to share this with those of you who do not speak Russian.

First, nobody in Russia believes that the sanctions will be lifted. Nobody. Of course, all the Russian politicians say that sanctions are wrong and not conducive to progress, but these are statements for external consumption. In interviews for the Russian media or on talk shows, there is a consensus that sanctions will never be lifted no matter what Russia does.

Second, nobody in Russia believes that sanctions are a reaction to Crimea or to the Russian involvement in the Donbass. Nobody. There is a consensus that the Russian policy towards Crimea and the Donbass are not a cause, but a pretext for the sanctions. The real cause of the sanctions is unanimously identified as what the Russians called the „process of sovereignization“, i.e. the fact that Russia is back, powerful and rich, and that she dares openly defy and disobey the „Axis of Kindness“.

Third, there is a consensus in Russia that the correct response to the sanctions is double: a) an external realignment of the Russian economy away from the West and b) internal reforms which will make Russia less dependent on oil exports and on the imports of various goods and technologies.

Fourth, nobody blames Putin for the sanctions or for the resulting hardships. Everybody fully understands that Putin is hated by the West not for doing something wrong, but for doing something right. In fact, Putin’s popularity is still at an all-time high.

Fifth, there is a wide agreement that the current Russian vulnerability is the result of past structural mistakes which now must be corrected, but nobody suggests that the return of Crimea to Russia or the Russian support for Novorussia were wrong or wrongly executed.

Finally, I would note that while Russia is ready for war, there is no bellicose mood at all. Most Russians believe that the US/NATO/EU don’t have what it takes to directly attack Russia, they believe that the junta in Kiev is doomed and they believe that sending the Russian tanks to Kiev (or even Novorussia) would have been a mistake.

The above is very important because if you consider all these factors you can come to an absolutely unavoidable conclusion: western sanctions have exactly zero chance of achieving any change at all in Russian foreign policy and exactly zero chance of weakening the current regime.

In fact, if anything, these sanctions strengthen the Eurasian Sovereignists by allowing them to blame all the pain of economic reforms on the sanctions and they weaken the Atlantic Integrationists by making any overt support for, or association with, the West a huge political liability.

But the Eurocretins in Brussels don’t care I suppose, as long as they feel relevant or important, even if it is only in their heads.

zerohedge, Feb 17, 2015 — http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-17/what-russians-think-western-sanctions

What Russians Think Of Western Sanctions
Submitted by Vineyard of the Saker,

I parse the Russian media (corporate and social) on a daily basis and I am always amazed at the completely different way the issue of western sanctions is discussed. I think that it is important and useful for me to share this with those of you who do not speak Russian.

First, nobody in Russia believes that the sanctions will be lifted. Nobody. Of course, all the Russian politicians say that sanctions are wrong and not conducive to progress, but these are statements for external consumption. In interviews for the Russian media or on talk shows, there is a consensus that sanctions will never be lifted no matter what Russia does.

Second, nobody in Russia believes that sanctions are a reaction to Crimea or to the Russian involvement in the Donbass. Nobody. There is a consensus that the Russian policy towards Crimea and the Donbass are not a cause, but a pretext for the sanctions. The real cause of the sanctions is unanimously identified as what the Russians called the „process of sovereignization“, i.e. the fact that Russia is back, powerful and rich, and that she dares openly defy and disobey the „Axis of Kindness“.

Third, there is a consensus in Russia that the correct response to the sanctions is double: a) an external realignment of the Russian economy away from the West and b) internal reforms which will make Russia less dependent on oil exports and on the imports of various goods and technologies.

Fourth, nobody blames Putin for the sanctions or for the resulting hardships. Everybody fully understands that Putin is hated by the West not for doing something wrong, but for doing something right. In fact, Putin’s popularity is still at an all-time high.

Fifth, there is a wide agreement that the current Russian vulnerability is the result of past structural mistakes which now must be corrected, but nobody suggests that the return of Crimea to Russia or the Russian support for Novorussia were wrong or wrongly executed.

Finally, I would note that while Russia is ready for war, there is no bellicose mood at all. Most Russians believe that the US/NATO/EU don’t have what it takes to directly attack Russia, they believe that the junta in Kiev is doomed and they believe that sending the Russian tanks to Kiev (or even Novorussia) would have been a mistake.

The above is very important because if you consider all these factors you can come to an absolutely unavoidable conclusion: western sanctions have exactly zero chance of achieving any change at all in Russian foreign policy and exactly zero chance of weakening the current regime.

In fact, if anything, these sanctions strengthen the Eurasian Sovereignists by allowing them to blame all the pain of economic reforms on the sanctions and they weaken the Atlantic Integrationists by making any overt support for, or association with, the West a huge political liability.

But the Eurocretins in Brussels don’t care I suppose, as long as they feel relevant or important, even if it is only in their heads.

======
Martin Zeis
globalcrisis/globalchange NEWS
martin.zeis@gmxpro.net